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Abstract
Unlike normal-form games, where correlated equilibria have been studied for more
than 45 years, extensive-form correlation is still generally not well understood.
Part of the reason for this gap is that the sequential nature of extensive-form
games allows for a richness of behaviors and incentives that are not possible in
normal-form settings. This richness translates to a significantly different complexity
landscape surrounding extensive-form correlated equilibria. As of today, it is known
that finding an optimal extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE), extensive-
form coarse correlated equilibrium (EFCCE), or normal-form coarse correlated
equilibrium (NFCCE) in a two-player extensive-form game is computationally
tractable when the game does not include chance moves, and intractable when the
game involves chance moves. In this paper we significantly refine this complexity
threshold by showing that, in two-player games, an optimal correlated equilibrium
can be computed in polynomial time, provided that a certain condition is satisfied.
We show that the condition holds, for example, when all chance moves are public,
that is, both players observe all chance moves. This implies that an optimal EFCE,
EFCCE and NFCCE can be computed in polynomial time in the game size in two-
player games with public chance moves, providing the biggest positive complexity
result surrounding extensive-form correlation in more than a decade.
1 Introduction
A vast body of literature in computational game theory has focused on computing Nash equilibria
(NEs) in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information extensive-form games. Success stories from
that endeavor include the creation of strong—in some cases superhuman—AIs for several complex
games, including two-player limit Texas hold’em [4], two-player no-limit Texas hold’em [5, 6, 20],
and multiplayer no-limit Texas hold’em [7]. NE captures strategic interactions in which each
player maximizes her own utility. The interaction in NE is assumed to be fully decentralized: no
communication between players is possible and the behavior of the players is not coordinated by
any external orchestrator in any way. While that assumption is natural in games such as poker, NE
is too restrictive in other types of strategic interactions in which partial forms of communication or
centralized control are possible [1]. Therefore, there has been growing interest around less restrictive
solution concepts than NE.
Correlated and coarse correlated equilibria are classic families of solution concepts that relax the
assumptions of NE to allow forms of coordination of utility-maximizing agents [3, 21]. In correlated
and coarse correlated equilibria, a mediator that can recommend behavior—but not enforce it—
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Figure 1: Overview of the connections among this paper’s results.
complements the game. Before the interaction starts, the mediator samples a profile of recommended
strategies (one for each player) from a publicly known correlated distribution. The mediator reveals
the next recommended move (or sequence of moves, depending on the specific solution concept in the
family) to each acting player. In correlated equilibrium, each agent must decide whether to commit
to following the next recommended move (or sequence of moves) after such move or sequence of
moves is revealed by the mediator. In coarse correlated equilibrium, each agent must decide whether
to commit to following the next recommended move (or sequence of moves) before it is revealed by
the mediator. If a player chooses not to follow the recommendation, the mediator stops issuing further
recommendations to that player. Since the selfish agents are free to not follow the recommendations,
it is up to the mediator to come up with a correlated distribution of recommendations such that
no agent has incentive to deviate from the recommendations, assuming no other player deviates.
Despite the apparent weakness of a mediator that cannot enforce behavior but only suggest it, the
maximum social welfare (that is, sum of the players’ utilities) that can be induced by these families
of solution concepts is greater than the social welfare obtainable by NE. Examples of interactions
where a mediator is natural include traffic control and load balancing [1].
These equilibrium concepts have typically been studied in normal-form (that is, matrix) games. The
study of correlation in extensive-form (that is, tree-form) games is recent, and was pioneered by von
Stengel and Forges [24]. Three correlated solution concepts are often used in extensive-form games:
extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) [24], extensive-form coarse correlated equilibrium
(EFCCE) [13], and normal-form coarse correlated equilibrium (NFCCE) [21, 8, 9]. Compared to
normal-form (that is, one-shot) games, extensive-form correlation poses new and different challenges,
especially in settings where the agents retain private information. This is unique to the sequential
nature of extensive-form games, where, fundamentally, players can adjust strategically as they
make observations about their opponents and the environment [11]. These challenges also translate
to some negative complexity results for extensive-form correlation [15, 24]. While a landmark
positive complexity result in game theory shows that one EFCE, EFCCE, or NFCCE can be found in
polynomial time [22, 16, 17], the computation of an optimal (that is, one that maximizes or minimizes
a given linear objective, such as social welfare) EFCE, EFCCE, or NFCCE is computationally
intractable in games with more than two players, as well as two-player games with chance moves,
and tractable in two-player games without chance moves [24].
In this paper we significantly refine this complexity threshold by showing that, in two-player games,
an optimal correlated equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, provided that a certain
triangle-freeness condition—which can be checked in polynomial time—is satisfied. We prove that
the condition holds, for example, when all chance moves are public, that is, both players observe
all chance moves. This includes, for example, games where the chance outcomes amount to public
dice rolls or public revelations of cards. Specifically, we show that the set of correlation plans Ξ of a
triangle-free game coincides with the von Stengel-Forges polytope V of the game—a polytope that
only requires a polynomial number of linear “probability-mass-conserving” constraints. Since V can
be represented using a polynomial number of constraints in the input game size, optimizing over this
set can be efficiently done by means of, for example, linear programming methods.
In Figure 1 we give an overview of the results in this paper and how they relate to each other. Our
main result is that the polytope of correlation plans Ξ coincides with the von Stengel-Forges polytope
V when the game satisfies the triangle-freeness condition that we introduce (Definition 3). As we
show in Theorem 1, every two-player game with public chance moves (which includes games with
no chance moves at all) is triangle-free, but not all triangle-free games have public chance moves. So,
our results also apply to some games where chance is not public. The equality Ξ = V in triangle-free
games implies that an optimal EFCE, EFCCE and NFCCE can be computed in polynomial time. This
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is because V has a polynomial (in the game size) description [24] and the computation of an EFCE,
EFCCE, NFCCE can be expressed as a linear program [24, 13].
We prove Ξ = V in several steps. First, we show that in triangle-free games, V admits a structural
decomposition in terms of scaled extension operations. This type of decomposition of V was
introduced by Farina et al. [12] as a way of “unrolling” the combinatorial structure of V to construct
an efficient regret minimization algorithm for Ξ in two-player games without chance moves. We
extend their construction to handle any triangle-free game. Then, we show a deep connection between
the integrality of the vertices of the von Stengel-Forges polytope V and Ξ. Namely, in Theorem 3, we
show that Ξ = V holds if and only if all of V’s vertices have integer {0, 1} coordinates. Finally, in
Section 4 we prove that V has integral vertices by leveraging its structural decomposition.
2 Preliminaries
Extensive-form games Extensive-form games (EFGs) are the standard model for games that are
played on a game tree. EFGs can capture sequential and simultaneous moves as well as private
information. Each node in the EFG belongs to one player. One special player, called the chance
player, is used to model random stochastic events, such as rolling a die or drawing cards. In this
paper, we only consider games that have two players in addition to potentially having a chance player.
Edges leaving from a node represent actions that a player can take at that node. To model private
information, the game tree is supplemented with an information partition, defined as a partition of
nodes into sets called information sets. Each node belongs to exactly one information set, and each
information set is a nonempty set of tree nodes for the same Player i. An information set for Player i
denotes a collection of nodes that Player i cannot distinguish among, given what she has observed so
far. The symbols I1 and I2 denote the information partition of Player 1 and 2, respectively. Let I1
and I2 be information sets for Player 1 and 2, respectively. I1 and I2 are connected, denoted I1 
 I2,
if there exist nodes u ∈ I1 and v ∈ I2 such that u is on the path from the root to v, or vice versa.
We will only consider perfect-recall games, that is, no player forgets what the player knew earlier. As
a consequence, all nodes that belong to an information set I share the same set of available actions
(otherwise the player acting at those nodes would be able to distinguish among them), which we denote
by AI . We define the set of sequences of Player i as the set Σi := {(I, a) : I ∈ Ii, a ∈ AI} ∪ {∅},
where the special element ∅ is called empty sequence. Given an information set I ∈ Ii, we denote by
σ(I) the parent sequence of I, defined as the last pair (I ′, a′) ∈ Σi encountered on the path from the
root to any node v ∈ I; if no such pair exists we let σ(I) = ∅.
An important concept in extensive-form correlation is relevance of sequence pairs. Intuitively, two
sequences are relevant if they belong to connected information sets or if either of them is the empty
sequence. Formally, a pair of sequences (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 is relevant, denoted σ1 ./ σ2, if either σ1
or σ2 or both is the empty sequence, or if σ1 = (I1, a1) and σ2 = (I2, a2) and I1 
 I2. The set of all
relevant sequence pairs is denoted Σ1 ./Σ2. Given σ1 ∈ Σ1 and I2 ∈ I2, we say that σ1 is relevant
for I2, and write σ1 ./ I2, if σ1 = ∅ or if σ1 = (I1, a1) and I1 
 I2 (an analogous statement holds
for I1 ./ σ2). We say that a sequence σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi for Player i is descendent of another sequence
σ′ = (I ′, a′) ∈ Σi for the same player, denoted by σ  σ′, if σ = σ′ or if there is a path from the root
of the game to a node v ∈ I that passes through action a′ at some node v′ ∈ I ′. We use the notation
τ  τ ′ to mean τ  τ ′ ∧ τ 6= τ ′.
A reduced-normal-form plan pii for Player i defines a choice of action for every information set
I ∈ Ii that is still reachable as a result of the other choices in pi itself. We denote the set of reduced-
normal-form plans of Player i by Πi. We denote by Πi(I) the subset of reduced-normal-form plans
that prescribe all actions for Player i on the path from the root to information set I.
Polytope of correlation plans (Ξ) A correlated distribution µ over combinations of plans Π1 ×Π2
of the players can be thought of as a point in probability simplex ∆|Π1×Π2|. Since the number of
plans of each player is exponential in the game tree size, so is that representation of µ. Therefore,
von Stengel and Forges [24] introduced a more compact representation of µ, called the correlation
plan representation. The set of all legal correlation plans is denoted Ξ and called the polytope of
correlation plans. The set Ξ is a convex polytope in R|Σ1 ./Σ2|≥0 , so the number of variables is at most
quadratic in the game tree size. However, it might still require an exponential number of constraints.
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An optimal EFCE, EFCCE, or NFCCE is an optimal correlation plan subject to a set of linear incentive
constraints [24, 11, 13]. These constraints encode the requirement that the set of corrrelated behavior
be incentive compatible for the player, that is, that no player would be better off not following the
recommended behavior than to always follow it. Hence, an optimal EFCE, EFCCE, or NFCCE can
be computed as the solution of a linear program. Furthermore, the linear program can be solved in
polynomial time if and only if Ξ can be described with a polynomial number of linear constraints.
Thus the characterization of the constraints that define Ξ in various classes of games is important.
The von Stengel-Forges polytope (V) The characterization of the constraints that define Ξ was
initiated by von Stengel and Forges [24] in their landmark paper on extensive-form correlation. In
particular, they show that in two-player perfect-recall games without chance moves, Ξ coincides with
a particular polytope V—which we call the von Stengel-Forges polytope—whose description only
uses a polynomial number of linear constraints, which are “probability-mass-conserving” constraints:
V :=
v ∈ R|Σ1 ./Σ2|≥0 :
• v[∅,∅] = 1
• ∑a∈AI v[(I1, a), σ2] = v[σ(I1), σ2] ∀I1 ∈ I1, σ2 ∈ Σ2 s.t. I1 ./ σ2
• ∑a∈AJ v[σ1, (I2, a)] = v[σ1, σ(I2)] ∀I2 ∈ I2, σ1 ∈ Σ1 s.t. σ1 ./ I2
. (1)
The polytope V is well defined in every game. However, the equality Ξ = V was known to hold only
in two-player games without chance moves. In more general games, it is only known that Ξ ⊆ V . The
main contribution of our paper is to show that the equality Ξ = V holds in significantly more general
games than two-player games without chance moves. We will isolate a condition, which we coin
triangle freeness, that is sufficient for Ξ = V to hold. We also show that all two-player games where
all chance moves are public (including two-player games without chance moves) are triangle free.
3 Scaled-Extension-Based Structural Decomposition for V
Farina et al. [12] recently showed that in two-player games without chance moves, a particular
structural decomposition theorem holds for the von Stengel-Forges polytope V. At the core of their
decomposition is a convexity-preserving operation, scaled extension, defined as follows.
Definition 1 ([12]). Let X and Y be nonempty, compact and convex sets, and let h : X → R≥0 be a
nonnegative affine real function. The scaled extension of X with Y via h is defined as the set
X h/ Y := {(x,y) : x ∈ X , y ∈ h(x)Y}.
Specifically, they show that in two-player games without chance moves, V admits a decomposition of
the form V = {1} / h1 X1 / h2 X2 / h3 · · · / hn Xn, where each of the sets Xi is either the singleton set
{1}, or a probability simplex ∆si := {x ∈ Rsi≥0 : ‖x‖1 = 1} for some appropriate dimension si.
In this section, we significantly extend their result. As we will show, an analogous scaled-extension-
based decomposition of V exists in far more general games than those without chance moves. In
particular, in Section 3.1 we isolate a condition on the information structure of the game—which we
coin triangle freeness—that guarantees existence of a scaled-extension-based decomposition. Then,
we will present an algorithm for computing such a decomposition, that is, finding the hi functions and
sets Xi. Since our full algorithm is rather intricate, we start by giving three examples of increasing
complexity that capture the main intuition behind our structural decomposition routine.
First example The first example is shown in the first column of Figure 2. The game starts with a
chance node, where two outcomes (say, heads or tails) are possible. After observing the outcome of
the chance node, Player 1 chooses between two actions (say, the “left” and the “right” action). The
choice as to whether to play the left or the right action can be different based on the observed chance
outcome. After Player 1 has played their action, Player 2 has to pick whether to play their left or right
action—however, Player 2 does not observe the chance outcome nor Player 1’s action. The chance
outcome is not observed by Player 2, so, this is not a public-chance game.
The only information set C for Player 2 is connected to both information sets (denoted A and B
in Figure 2) of Player 1, so, all sequence pairs (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 are relevant. Since Player 2
only has one information set, it is easy to incrementally generate the von Stengel-Forges polytope.
First, the fixed value 1 is assigned to v[∅,∅] (step 1 in the fill-in order). Then, this value is split
arbitrarily into the two (non-negative) entries v[∅, 1], v[∅, 2] so that v[∅, 1] + v[∅, 2] = v[∅,∅] in
accordance with the von Stengel-Forges constraints. This operation can be expressed using scaled
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Figure 2: Three examples of extensive-form games with increasingly complex information partitions.
Crossed nodes belong the chance player, black round nodes belong to Player 1, white round nodes
belong to Player 2, gray round sets define information sets, white squares denote terminal states. The
numbers along the edges define concise names for sequences.
extension as {(v[∅,∅], v[∅, 1], v[∅, 2])} = {1} / h ∆2, where h is the identity function (step 2 in the
fill-in order). Then, v[∅, 1] is further split into v[1, 1] + v[2, 1] = v[∅, 1] and v[3, 1] + v[4, 1] = v[∅, 1],
while v[∅, 2] is split into v[1, 2] + v[2, 2] = v[∅, 2] and v[3, 2] + v[4, 2] = v[∅, 2] (step 3 of the
fill-in order). These operations can be expressed as scaled extensions with ∆2. Now that the
eight entries v[σ1, σ2] for σ1 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, σ2 ∈ {1, 2} have been filled out, we fill in v[σ1,∅] for
all σ1 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} in accordance with the von Stengel-Forges constraint v[σ1,∅] = v[σ1, 1] +
v[σ1, 2] (step 4 ). In this step, we are not splitting any values, but rather we are summing already-
filled-in entries in v to form new entries. Specifically, we can extend the set of partially-filled-
in vectors v = (v[∅,∅], v[∅, 1], v[∅, 2], v[1, 1], v[2, 1], v[3, 1], v[4, 1], v[1, 2], v[2, 2], v[3, 2], v[4, 2]) with
the new entry v[1,∅] by using the scaled extension operation {v} / h{1} where h is the (linear)
function that extracts the sum v[σ1, 1] + v[σ1, 2] from v. By doing so, we have incrementally filled
in all entries in v. Furthermore, by construction, we have that all von Stengel-Forges constraints
v[σ1,∅] = v[σ1, 1]+v[σ1, 2] (σ1 ∈ {∅, 1, 2, 3, 4}) and v[∅, σ2] = v[1, σ2]+v[2, σ2] = v[3, σ2]+v[4, σ2]
(σ2 ∈ {1, 2}) must hold. So, the only two von Stengel-Forges constraints that we have ignored and
might potentially be violated are v[∅,∅] = v[1,∅] + v[2,∅] and v[∅,∅] = v[3,∅] + v[4,∅]. This
concern is quickly resolved by noting that those constraints are implied by the other ones that we
satisfy. In particular, by construction we have v[1,∅]+v[2,∅] = (v[1, 1]+v[1, 2])+(v[2, 1]+v[2, 2]) =
(v[1, 1] + v[2, 1]) + (v[1, 2] + v[2, 2]) = v[∅, 1] + v[∅, 2] = v[∅,∅], and an analogous statement holds
for v[3,∅] + v[4,∅]. So, all constraints hold and the scaled-extension-based decomposition is finished.
Remark 1. An approach that would start by splitting v[∅,∅] into v[1,∅] + v[2,∅] = v[∅,∅] and
v[3,∅] + v[4,∅] = v[∅,∅], thereby inverting the order of fill-in steps 4 and 2 , would fail. Indeed,
after filling v[σ1, σ2] for all σ1 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, σ2 ∈ {1, 2}), there would be no clear way of guaranteeing
that v[1, 1] + v[2, 1] = v[3, 1] + v[4, 1] (= v[∅, 1]).
Second example We now consider a variation of the game from the first example, where Player 2
observes the chance outcome but not the actions selected by Player 1. This game, shown in the
middle column of Figure 2, has public chance moves, because the chance outcome is observed by
all players. In this game, not all pairs of information sets are connected. In fact, only (A, C) and
(B, D) are connected information set pairs. Correspondingly, entries such as v[1, 3], v[4, 2], and v[2, 4]
are not defined in the correlation plans for the game. This observation is crucial, and will set apart
this example from the next one. To fill in any correlation plan, we can start by splitting v[∅,∅] into
v[1,∅] + v[2,∅] = v[∅,∅] and v[3,∅] + v[4,∅] = v[∅,∅] (fill-in step 2 in the figure). Both operations
can be expressed as a scaled extension of partially-filled-in vectors with ∆2, scaled by the affine
function that extracts v[∅,∅] = 1 from the partially-filled-in correlation plans. Then, we further
split those values into entries v[σ1, 1] + v[σ1, 2] = v[σ1,∅] for σ1 ∈ {1, 2} in accordance with the von
Stengel-Forges constraint. Similarly, we will in v[σ1, 3], v[σ1, 4] for σ1 ∈ {3, 4} in accordance with
the constraint v[σ1, 3] + v[σ1, 4] = v[σ1,∅] for σ1 ∈ {1, 2} (fill-in step 3 ). Finally, we recover the
values of v[∅, σ2] for σ2 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} with a scaled extension with the singleton set {1} as discussed
in the previous example. Again, it can be checked that despite the fact that we ignored the constraints
v[∅, 1] + v[∅, 2] = v[∅,∅] and v[∅, 3] + v[∅, 4] = v[∅,∅], those constraints are automatically satisfied
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by constuction. In this case, we were able to sidestep the issue raised in Remark 1 because of the
particular connection between the information sets.
Third example Finally, we propose a third example in the third column of Figure 2. It is a variation
of the first example, where Player 2 now observes Player 1’s action but not the chance outcome. The
most significant difference with the second example is that the information structure of the game is
now such that all pairs of information sets of the players are connected. Hence, the problem raised in
Remark 1 cannot be avoided. Our decomposition algorithm cannot handle this example.
3.1 A Sufficient Condition for the Existence of a Scaled-Extension-Based Decomposition
The third example in the previous section highlights an unfavorable situation in which our decomposi-
tion attempt based on incremental generation of the correlation plan. In order to codify all situations
in which that issue does not arise, we introduce the concept of rank of an information set.
Definition 2. Let i ∈ {1, 2} be one player, and let −i denote the other player. Furthermore, let I ∈ Ii
and σ ∈ Σ−i. The σ-rank of I is the cardinality of the set {J ∈ I−i : J 
 I, σ(J) = σ}.
The issue in Remark 1 can be stated in terms of the ranks. Consider a relevant sequence pair
(σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 ./Σ2 and two connected information sets I1 
 I2 such that σ(I1) = σ1, σ(I2) = σ2.
If the σ1-rank of I2 and the σ2-rank of I1 are both greater than 1, the issue cannot be avoided and
the decomposition will fail. For example, in the third example, where our decomposition fails, all
information sets have ∅-rank 2. We prove that such situations cannot occur, provided the game
satisfies the following condition, which can be verified in polynomial time in the size of the EFG.
Definition 3 (Triangle-freeness). A two-player extensive-form game is triangle-free if, for any choice
of two distinct information sets I1, I2 ∈ I1 such that σ(I1) = σ(I2) = σ1 and two distinct information
sets J1, J2 ∈ I2 such that σ(J1) = σ(J2) = σ2, it is never the case that I1 
 J1 ∧ I2 
 J2 ∧ I1 
 J2.
In Theorem 1 we show that games with public chance (which includes games with no chance moves
at all) always satisfy the triangle-freeness condition of Definition 3.
Theorem 1. A two-player extensive-form game with public chance moves is triangle-free.
However, not all triangle-free games must have public chance nodes. For example, the topmost game
in Figure 2 is triangle-free, but in that game the chance outcome is not public to Player 2. So, our
results apply more broadly than games with public chance moves.
3.2 Computation of the Decomposition
We present our algorithm following the same structure as [12]. Like theirs, our algorithm consists of a
recursive function, DECOMPOSE. It takes three arguments: (i) a sequence pair (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 ./Σ2, (ii)
a subset S of the set of all relevant sequence pairs, and (iii) a set D where only the entries indexed by
the elements in S have been filled in. The decomposition for the whole von Stengel-Forges polytope
V is computed by calling DECOMPOSE((∅,∅), {(∅,∅)}, {(1)})—this corresponds to the starting
situation in which only the entry v[∅,∅] has been filled in (denoted as fill-in step 1 in Figure 2). Each
call to DECOMPOSE returns a pair (S′,D′) of updated indices and partial vectors, to reflect the new
entries that were filled in during the call.
DECOMPOSE((σ1, σ2),S,D) operates as follows (we denote with −i the opponent for Player i):
1. Let Ji := {I ∈ Ii : I ./ σ−i, σ(I) = σi} for all i ∈ {1, 2}, and J ∗ ← ∅.
2. For each (I1, I2) ∈ J1 × J2 such that I1 
 I2, if the σ2-rank of I1 is greater than or equal to the
σ1-rank of I2, we branch on Player 1, update J ∗ ← J ∗ ∪ {I1}. Else, update J ∗ ← J ∗ ∪ {I2}.
3. For each i ∈ {1, 2} and I ∈ Ji such that the σ−i-rank of I is 0, do J ∗ ← J ∗ ∪ {I}.
4. For each I ∈ J ∗: (Below we assume that I ∈ I1, the other case is symmetrical)
(a) Fill in all entries {v[(I, a), σ2] : a ∈ AI} by splitting v[σ1, σ2]. This can be expressed
using a scaled extension operation as D ← D / h ∆|AI | where h extracts ξ[σ1, σ2] from any
partially-filled-in vector.
(b) Update S ← S ∪ {((I, a), σ2)} to reflect that the entries corresponding to (I, a) ./ σ2 have
been filled in.
(c) For each a ∈ AI we assign (S,D)← DECOMPOSE(((I, a), σ2),S,D).
(d) Let K := {J ∈ I2 :I 
 J}. For all J ∈ I2 such that σ(J)  (J ′, a′) for some J ′ ∈ K, a′ ∈ AJ′ :
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• If I 
 J , then for all a ∈ AJ we fill in the sequence pair ξ[σ1, (J, a)] by assign-
ing its value in accordance with the von Stengel-Forges constraint ξ[σ1, (J, a)] =∑
a∗∈AI∗ ξ[(I
∗, a∗), (J, a)] via the scaled extension D ← D / h{1} where the linear func-
tion h maps a partially-filled-in vector to the value of
∑
a∗∈AI∗ ξ[(I
∗, a∗), (J, a)].
• Otherwise, we fill in the entries {ξ[σ1, (J, a)] : a ∈ AJ}, by splitting the value ξ[σ1, σ(J)].
In this case, we let D ← D / h ∆|AJ | where h extracts the entry ξ[σ1, σ(J)] from a
partially-filled-in vector in D.
5. At this point, all the entries corresponding to indices S˜ = {(σ′1, σ′2) : σ′1  σ1, σ′2  σ2} have been
filled in, and we return (S ∪ S˜,D).
The above algorithm formalizes and generalizes the first two examples of Figure 2. For example, step
2 of the fill-in order in either example is captured in Step 4(a), while fill-in step 3 corresponds to
Step 4(c). Finally, fill-in step 4 corresponds to Step 4(d).
Compared to the decomposition algorithm by Farina et al. [12], our branching steps (Step 4) are
significantly more intricate. This is because, compared to their setting (that is, two-player games
without chance moves) where at least one player has at most one information set with rank strictly
greater than one, we have to account for multiple information sets with rank greater than one. Since
two-player games without chance moves are a special case of two-player games with public chance
moves, our algorithm completely subsumes that of Farina et al. [12].
A proof of correctness for the algorithm is in Appendix A. In particular, the following holds.
Theorem 2. The von Stengel-Forges polytope V of a two-player perfect-recall triangle-free EFG can
be expressed via a sequence of scaled extensions with simplexes and singleton sets:
V = {1} h1/ X1 h2/ X2 h3/ · · · hn/ Xn, where, for i = 1, . . . , n, either Xi = ∆si or Xi = {1}, (2)
and hi is a linear function. Furthermore, an exact algorithm exists to compute such expression in
linear time in the dimensionality of V, and so, in time at most quadratic in the size of the game.
4 Bridging the Gap Between V and Ξ
As noted by von Stengel and Forges [24], the inclusion Ξ ⊆ V holds trivially in any game. The
reverse inclusion, Ξ ⊇ V, was shown for two-player games without chance moves, but no complete
characterization as to when that reverse inclusion holds was known before our paper. In Theorem 3,
we contribute a new connection between the reverse inclusion Ξ ⊇ V and the integrality of the vertices
of the von Stengel-Forges polytope (all proofs are in Appendix B).
Theorem 3. Let Γ be a two-player perfect-recall extensive-form game, let V be its von Stengel-Forges
polytope, and let Ξ be its polytope of correlation plans. Then, Ξ = V if and only if all vertices of V
have integer {0, 1} coordinates.
As it turns out, the scaled-based decomposition of V can be used to conclude the integrality of the
vertices of V, by leveraging the following analytical result about the scaled extension operation.
Lemma 1. Let X ,Y , and h be as in Definition 1. If X is a convex polytope with vertices {x1, . . . ,xn},
and Y is a convex polytope with vertices {y1, . . . ,ym}, then X / h Y is a convex polytope whose
vertices are a nonempty subset of {(xi, h(xi)yj) : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}}.
In particular, by applying Lemma 1 inductively on the structure of the scaled-extension-based
structural decomposition of V, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let V be the von Stengel-Forges polytope of a two-player triangle-free game (Defini-
tion 3). All vertices of V have integer {0, 1} coordinates.
Finally, combining Theorem 4 and Theorem 3, we obtain the central theorem of this paper.
Theorem 5. In a two-player perfect-recall extensive-form game that satisfies the triangle-freeness
condition (Definition 3), the polytope of correlation plans coincides with the von Stengel-Forges
polytope. Consequently, an optimal EFCE, EFCCE, or NFCCE can be computed in polynomial time
(in the size of the input extensive-form game) in two-player triangle-free games.
A consequence of V = Ξ is that the linear programs for EFCE [24], EFCCE [13] and NFCCE [13]—
originally formulated for two-player games without chance moves only—hold verbatim for any
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triangle-free game. So, an optimal EFCE, EFCCE, and NFCCE can be computed in polynomial time
as the solution of those linear programs. Furthermore, the scaled-extension-based decomposition for
triangle-free games (Section 3) can be combined with the scaled extension regret circuit introduced
by Farina et al. [12, 10] to construct a scalable regret minimization algorithm for V = Ξ. That, in
turn, can be used to compute an EFCE, EFCCE, and NFCCE in large triangle-free games that are too
large for traditional linear programming methods.
5 Experimental Evaluation
We implemented the scaled-extension-based decomposition routine of Section 3. We test our de-
composition algorithm for triangle-free games on Goofspiel [23], a popular benchmark game in
computational game theory. In Goofspiel, each player has a personal deck of cards made of k different
ranks (from 1 to k). A third deck (the “prize” deck) is shuffled and put face down on the board at the
beginning of the game. In each turn, the topmost card from the prize deck is publicly revealed. Then,
each player privately picks a card from their hand—this card acts as a bid to win the card that was
just revealed from the prize deck. The player that bids the highest wins the prize card. We use an
established tie-breaking rule: the prize card is discarded if the players’ bids are equal. Furthermore,
we adopt the convention that only the winner is revealed, but not the bids, in accordance with prior
computational game theory literature [19, 18]. The players’ scores are computed as the sum of the
values of the prize cards they have won. Because of the tie-breaking rule, Goofspiel is a general-sum
game. Furthermore, since all chance outcomes are public, it is a triangle-free game.
In Figure 3(left) we report the performance of our decomposition routine for k = 3, 4, 5, both in terms
of number of scaled extension operations required in the decomposition (Theorem 2) and of runtime
of our single-threaded implementation, as well as the dimensions of the games. The runtime was
averaged over 100 independent runs. Our decomposition algorithm performs well, and is able to
scale to the largest game (Goofspiel with k = 5 ranks, which has 3.6× 107 relevant sequence pairs).
In Figure 3(right) we used the characterization Ξ = V to compute the set of all payoffs that can be
reached by an EFCE, EFCCE, or NFCCE in 3-rank Goofspiel. The sets are highly non-trivial, and
reinforce the observation that the behaviors and incentives that can be induced through extensive-form
correlation are subtle and complex [11]. The sets of reachable payoff vectors was computed using
Polymake, a library for computational polyhedral geometry [14, 2].
Deck
size
Information sets Sequences Decomposition
|I1 ∪ I2| |I1 
 I2| |Σ1 ∪ Σ2| |Σ1 ./Σ2| Num / h Runtime
3 ranks 4.3×102 1.1×103 5.2×102 3.3×103 2.9×103 2ms
4 ranks 1.7×104 8.1×104 2.1×104 2.7×105 2.4×105 1.1s
5 ranks 1.2×106 1.1×107 1.4×106 3.6×107 3.2×107 43.8s
Figure 3: (Left) Dimensions of games and runtime of decomposition
algorithm (Theorem 2). (Right) Payoffs that can be reached using an
EFCE, EFCCE, or NFCCE in 3-rank Goofspiel.
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We also implemented the linear programming formulation of EFCE described by von Stengel and
Forges [24], and the scalable regret minimization algorithm of Farina et al. [12]. We use the Gurobi
commercial linear programming solver to solve the linear program formulation. As the game size
increases, the barrier algorithm is the only algorithm that can solve the linear program. However,
even that quickly becomes impractical. In the largest game, Gurobi uses roughly 200GB of memory,
spends approximately 90 minutes to precondition the linear program, and requires slightly more than
20 minutes to perform each iteration of the barrier method using 30 threads. The regret minimization
scales significantly more favorable in the large game. It requires roughly 6 seconds per iteration, and
reaches 10−2 infeasibility in 4 minutes, 10−3 infeasibility in 12 minutes, and 10−4 infeasibility in
110 minutes. Additional data about the experiment is available in Appendix C.
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6 Conclusions
We showed that an optimal extensive-form correlated equilibrium, extensive-form coarse correlated
equilibrium, and normal-form coarse correlated equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in
two-player perfect-recall games that satisfy a certain triangle-freeness condition that we introduced
and that can be checked in polynomial time. To show that such equilibria can be found in polynomial
time, we gave and combined several results that may be of independent interest: (1) the existence
of a scaled-extension-based structural decomposition for the von Stengel-Forges polytope of the
game, (2) a characterization of when the von Stengel-Forges polytope coincides with the polytope
of correlation plans, and (3) a result about the integrality of the vertices of the von Stengel-Forges
polytope in triangle-free games.
Broader Impact
In this paper we give a positive complexity result, showing that optimal equilibrium according to three
important extensive-form imperfect-information game correlated solution concepts can be computed
efficiently in settings—two-player games with public chance moves—where it was generally believed
to be impossible. In fact, we showed that this can be done more broadly: in all games where a certain
triangle-freeness condition holds.
Correlated solution concepts have many advantages. First, they enable incentive-compatible coor-
dination of agents. Such coordination is achieved via incentives, rather than forcing: mediators in
correlated solution concepts are only able to recommend behavior, but not force it. So, it is up to
the mediator to come up with a correlated distribution of recommendations such that no agent has
incentive to deviate from the recommendations. Second, in some general-sum interactions these
solution concepts are known to enable significantly higher social welfare than Nash equilibrium,
while at the same time sidestepping some of the other shortcomings of Nash equilibrium (for example,
some equilibrium selection issues).
In this paper, we are particularly interested in optimal correlated equilibria. In other words, our
technology can empower the system designer (mediator) to select, among the infinite number of
correlated equilibria of the game, one that maximizes a given objective. For example, this technology
could be used to find correlated equilibria than maximize social welfare, leading to highest societal
good. However, like most technology, our technology has potential for abuse. If used maliciously, the
ability to select particular correlated equilibria could be used to minimize social welfare, maximize
only one of the agent’s utility, or minimize all others’ utilities—thereby furthering existing inequality
or creating new inequality.
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A Scaled-Extension-Based Structural Decomposition for V
A.1 Triangle-Freeness
Lemma 2. Consider a triangle-free game, let (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 ./Σ2, and let I1 
 I2 be such that
σ(I1) = σ1, σ(I2) = σ2. Then, at most one between the σ1-rank of I2 and the σ2-rank of I1 is strictly
larger than 1.
Proof. The results follows almost immediately from the definition of triangle-freeness. We prove the
statement by contradiction. Let (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 ./Σ2 be a relevant sequence pair, and let information
sets I1 ∈ I1, I2 ∈ I2 be such that σ(I1) = σ1, σ(I2) = σ2. Furthermore, assume that the σ1-rank
of I2 is greater than 1, and at the same time the σ2-rank of I1 is greater than 1. Since the σ2-rank
of I1 is greater than 1, there exists an information set I ′2 ∈ I2, σ(I ′2) = σ2, distinct from I2, such
that I1 
 I ′2. Similarly, because the σ1-rank of I2 is greater than 1, there exists an information
set I ′1 ∈ I1, σ(I ′1) = σ1, distinct from I1, such that I ′1 
 I2. But then, we have found I1, I ′1 ∈ I1
and I ′2, I2 ∈ I2 such that σ(I1) = σ(I2) = σ1, σ(I ′2) = σ(I2) = σ2 such that I1 
 I ′2, I ′1 
 I2, and
I1 
 I2. So, the game is not triangle-free, contradiction.
Theorem 1. A two-player extensive-form game with public chance moves is triangle-free.
Proof. For contradiction, let I1, I2 be two distinct information sets for Player 1 such that σ(I1) =
σ(I2), let J1, J2 be two distinct information sets for Player 2 such that σ(J1) = σ(J2), and assume
that I1 
 J1, I2 
 J2, I1 
 J2. By definition of connectedness, there exist nodes u ∈ I1, v ∈ J1 such
that v is on the path from the root to u, or vice versa. Similarly, there exist nodes u′ ∈ I2, v′ ∈ J2
such that u′ is on the path from the root to v′, or vice versa. Let w be the lowest common ancestor of
u and u′. It is not possible that w = u or w = u′, because otherwise the parent sequences of I1 and I2
would be different. So w must be a strict ancestor of both u and u′, and u and u′ must be reached
using different edges at w. Therefore, node w cannot belongs to Player 1, or otherwise it again would
not be true that σ(I1) = σ(I2). So, there are only two possible cases: either w belongs to Player 2, or
it belongs to the chance player. We break the analysis accordingly.
• First case: w belongs to Player 2. From above, we know that u and u′ are reached by following
different branches at w. So, if both v and v′ were strict descendants of w, they would need to be
on two different branches of w (because they are connected to u and u′ respectively), violating
the condition σ(J1) = σ(J2). So, at least one between v and v′ is on the path from the root to w
(inclusive). But then either v is an ancestor of v′, or vice versa. Either case violates the hypothesis
that σ(J1) = σ(J2).
• Second case: w belongs to the chance player. If any between v and v′ is an ancestor of w, then
necessarily either v is an ancestor of v′, or v′ is an ancestor of v. Either case violates the condition
σ(J1) = σ(J2). So, both v and v′ must be descendants of w. Because v is on the path from the
root to u (or vice versa), and v′ is on the path from the root to u′ (or vice versa), then necessarily
u, v and u′, v′ are on two different branches of the chance node w. To fix names, call a the action
at w that must be taken to (eventually) reach u and v, and let b be the action that must be taken
to (eventually) reach u′ and v′. Now, we use the hypothesis that I1 
 J2, that is, there exists
u′′ ∈ I1, v′′ ∈ J2 such that u′′ is on the path from the root to v′′ or vice versa. Assume that u′′ is
on the path from the root to v′′. Since u′′ belongs to the same information set as u (that is, I1), and
since chance is public by hypothesis, then Player 1, when acting at u and u′′, must have observed
action a at w. In other words, the path from the root to u′′ must pass through action a at w. But
then, using the fact that u′′ is on the path from the root to v′′, this means that the path from the
root to v′′ passes through action a. However, the path from the root to v′ passes through action b.
Since chance is public, nodes v′ and v′′ cannot be in the same information set, because Player 2 is
able to distinguish them by means of the observed chance outcome. We reached a contradiction.
The symmetric case where v′′ is on the path from the root to u′′ is analogous.
A.2 Decomposition Algorithm
In this section, we provide pseudocode for the algorithm presented in Section 3.2. We will use the
following conventions:
• Given a player i ∈ {1, 2}, we let −i denote the opponent.
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• We use the symbol unionsq to denote disjoint union.
• Given two infosets I, I ′ ∈ Ii, we write I  I ′ if σ(I ′)  σ(I). We say that we iterate over a set
I ⊆ Ii in top-down order if, given any two I, I ′ ∈ I such that I  I ′, I appears before I ′ in the
iteration.
• We use the observation that for all I ∈ I1 and σ2 ∈ Σ2, I ./ σ2 if and only if (I, a) ./ σ2 ∀a ∈ AI .
(A symmetric statement holds for I ∈ I2 and σ1 ∈ Σ1.)
A.2.1 Two Useful Subroutines
We start by presenting two simple subroutines that capture fill-in step 4 of Figure 2 or equivalently
Step 4(d) of Section 3.2. The two subroutines are symmetric and have the role of filling rows and
columns of the correlation plans.
Algorithm 1: FILLOUTROW((σ1, σ2), I1,S,D)
Preconditions :(σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 ./Σ2, I1 ∈ I1, σ(I1) = σ1, (σ1, σ2) ∈ S
1 for I2 such that σ(I2) = σ2 and σ1 ./ I2 do
2 if I1 
 I2 then
3 for σ′2 ∈ {(I2, a) : a ∈ AI2} do
. Fill (σ1, σ′2) by summing up all entries {v[(I1, a′), σ′2] : a′ ∈ AI1} in accordance with the von
Stengel-Forges constraints
4 S ← S unionsq {(σ1, σ′2)}
5 D ← D / h{1} where h : v 7→∑a′∈AI1 v[(I1, a′), σ′2]
6 else
. Fill all {v[σ1, (I2, a)] : a ∈ AI2} by splitting v[σ1, σ2] accordance with the von Stengel-Forges
constraints
7 S ← S unionsq {(σ1, (I2, a)) : a ∈ AI2}
8 D ← D / h ∆|AI2 | where h : v 7→ v[σ1, σ2]
9 for σ′2 ∈ {(I2, a) : a ∈ AI2} do
10 FILLOUTROW((σ1, σ′2), I1)
11 return (S,D)
Algorithm 2: FILLOUTCOLUMN((σ1, σ2), I2,S,D)
Preconditions :(σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 ./Σ2, I2 ∈ I2, σ(I2) = σ2, (σ1, σ2) ∈ S
1 for I1 such that σ(I1) = σ1 and σ2 ./ I1 do
2 if I1 
 I2 then
3 for σ′ ∈ {(I1, a) : a ∈ AI1} do
. Fill (σ′1, σ2) by summing up all entries {v[σ′1, (I2, a′)] : a′ ∈ AI2} in accordance with the von
Stengel-Forges constraints
4 S ← S unionsq {(σ′1, σ2)}
5 D ← D / h{1} where h : v 7→∑a′∈AI2 v[σ′1, (I2, a′)]
6 else
. Fill all {v[(I1, a), σ2] : a ∈ AI1} by splitting v[σ1, σ2] accordance with the von Stengel-Forges
constraints
7 S ← S unionsq {((I1, a), σ2) : a ∈ AI1}
8 D ← D / h ∆|AI1 | where h : v 7→ v[σ1, σ2]
9 for σ′ ∈ {(I1, a) : a ∈ AI1} do
10 FILLOUTCOLUMN((σ′1, σ2), I2)
11 return (S,D)
The following inductive contract will be important for the full algortihm.
Lemma 3 (Inductive contract for FILLOUTROW). Suppose that the following preconditions hold
when FILLOUTROW((σ1, σ2), I1,S,D)) is called:
(Pre1) (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 ./Σ2;
(Pre2) I1 ∈ I1 is such that σ(I1) = σ;
(Pre3) S contains only relevant sequence pairs and D consists of vectors indexed by exactly the
indices in S;
(Pre4) (σ1, σ2) ∈ S, but (σ1, σ′2) /∈ S for all σ′2  σ2;
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(Pre5) For all a ∈ I1 and σ′2  σ2 such that I1 ./ σ′2, ((I1, a), σ′2) ∈ S;
(Pre6) If I1 ./ σ2, all v ∈ D satisfy the von Stengel-Forges constraint v[σ1, σ2] =∑
a∈I1 v[(I1, a), σ2];
(Pre7) All v ∈ D satisfy the von Stengel-Forges constraints
v[(I, a), σ(I2)] =
∑
a′∈AI2
v[(I, a), (I2, a
′)] ∀a ∈ I1, and I2 ∈ I2 : I1 ./ I2, σ(I2)  σ2.
Then, the sets (S′,D′) returned by the call are such that
(Post1) S′ contains only relevant sequence pairs and D′ consists of vectors indexed by exactly the
indices in S′;
(Post2) S′ = S unionsq {(σ1, σ′2) : σ′2  σ2, σ ./ σ′2};
(Post3) All v ∈ D′ satisfy the von Stengel-Forges constraints
v[σ1, σ(I2)] =
∑
a′∈AI2
v[σ1, (I2, a
′)] ∀I2 ∈ I2 : σ ./ I2, σ(I2)  σ2
and all von Stengel-Forges constraints
v[σ1, σ
′
2] =
∑
a∈AI1
v[(I, a), σ′2] ∀σ′2 ∈ Σ2 : σ′2 ./ I1, σ′2  σ2.
Proof. By induction.
• Base case. The base case corresponds to σ2 ∈ Σ2 such that no information set I2 ∈ I2 : σ(I2) =
σ2 ∧ σ1 ./ I2 exists. In that case, Algorithm 1 returns immediately, so (Post1) holds trivially from
(Pre3). Since no I2 such that σ(I2) = σ2 ∧ σ1 ./ I2 exists, no σ′2  σ2 such that σ1 ./ σ′2 exists, so
(Post2) holds as well. The first set of constraints of (Post3) is empty, and the second set reduces
to (Pre6).
• Inductive step. Suppose that the inductive hypothesis holds when σ′2  σ2. We will show that it
holds when σ′2 = σ2 as well. In order to use the inductive hypothesis, we first need to check that
the preconditions are preserved at the time of the recursive call on Line 10. (Pre1) holds since
σ1 ./ I2. (Pre2) holds trivially since σ does not chance. (Pre3) holds since we are updating S and
D in tandem on lines 4, 5 and 7, 8. (Pre4) holds since by the time of the recursive call we have
only filled in entries (σ1, σ′2) where σ′2 is an immediate successor of σ2. (Pre5) at Line 10 holds
trivially, since it refers to a subset of the entries for which the condition held at the beginning of
the call. (Pre6) holds because I1 ./ σ′2 ⇐⇒ I1 
 I2. Hence, if I1 ./ σ′2 then Lines 4 and 5 must
have run. (Pre7) at Line 10 holds trivially, since it refers to a subset of the constraints for which
the condition held at the beginning of the call. Using the inductive hypothesis, (Post1), (Post2),
and the second set of constraints in (Post3) follow immediately. The only constraints that are left
to be verified are
v[σ1, σ2] =
∑
a′∈AI2
v[σ1, (I2, a
′)] ∀I2 ∈ I2 : σ ./ I2, σ(I2) = σ2. (3)
That constraint is guaranteed by Lines 7 and 8 for all I2 6
 I1. So, we need to verify that it holds
for all those I2 such that σ(I2) = σ2, σ ./ I2 and I1 
 I2. Let I2 be one such information set.
Then, from Lines 4 and 5 we have that
v[σ1, (I2, a)] =
∑
a′∈AI1
v[(I, a′), (I2, a)] ∀a ∈ AI2 .
Summing the above equations across all a ∈ AI2 and using (Pre7) yields∑
a∈AI2
v[σ1, (I2, a)] =
∑
a∈AI2
∑
a′∈AI1
v[(I, a′), (I2, a)]
=
∑
a′∈AI1
∑
a∈AI2
v[(I, a′), (I2, a)]
=
∑
a′∈AI1
v[(I, a′), σ(I2)]
=
∑
a′∈AI1
v[(I, a′), σ2],
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where we used the hypothesis that σ(I2) = σ2 in the last equality. Finally, since I1 
 I2 and
σ(I2) = σ2, it must be I1 ./ σ2 and so, using (Pre6), we obtain that∑
a∈AI2
v[σ1, (I2, a)] = v[σ1, σ2],
completing the proof of Equation (3). So, (Post3) holds as well and the proof of the inductive step
is complete.
The inductive contract for FILLOUTCOLUMN is symmetric and we omit it.
A.2.2 The Full Algorithm
Algorithm 3: DECOMPOSE((σ1, σ2),S,D)
Preconditions :(σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 ./Σ2, (σ1, σ2) ∈ S
1 B ← ∅
2 for all i ∈ {1, 2}, I ∈ Ii, σ(I) = σi, σ−i ./ I do
3 if the σ−i-rank of I is 0 then
4 B ← B unionsq I
5 for (I1, I2) ∈ I1 × I2 such that σ(I1) = σ1, σ(I2) = σ2, I1 
 I2 do
6 if the σ2-rank of I1 is ≥ the σ1-rank of I2 then
7 B ← B unionsq I1
8 else
9 B ← B unionsq I2
10 for I ∈ B do
11 if I ∈ I1 then
. Fill all {v[(I, a), σ2] : a ∈ AI} by splitting v[σ1, σ2] accordance with the von Stengel-Forges
constraints
12 S ← S unionsq {((I, a), σ2) : a ∈ AI}
13 D ← D / h ∆|AI | where h : v 7→ v[σ1, σ2]
. Recursive call
14 for σ′1 ∈ {(I, a) : a ∈ AI} do
15 DECOMPOSE((σ′1, σ2),S,D)
. Fill a portion of the row for σ1
16 for I2 ∈ I2 : σ1 ./ I2, σ(I2) = σ2 do
17 for σ′2 ∈ {(I2, a′) : a′ ∈ AI2} do
. Fill (σ1, σ′2) by summing up all entries {v[(I, a′), σ′2] : a′ ∈ AI} in accordance with the
von Stengel-Forges constraints
18 S ← S unionsq {(σ1, σ′2)}
19 D ← D / h{1} where h : v 7→∑a′∈AI v[(I, a′), σ′2]
20 FILLOUTROW((σ1, σ′2), I)
21 else
. Fill all {v[σ1, (I, a)] : a ∈ AI} by splitting v[σ1, σ2] accordance with the von Stengel-Forges
constraints
22 S ← S unionsq {(σ1, (I, a)) : a ∈ AI}
23 D ← D / h ∆|AI | where h : v 7→ v[σ1, σ2]
. Recursive call
24 for σ′2 ∈ {(I, a) : a ∈ AI} do
25 DECOMPOSE((σ1, σ′2),S,D)
. Fill a portion of the column for σ2
26 for I1 ∈ I1 : σ2 ./ I1, σ(I1) = σ1 do
27 for σ′1 ∈ {(I1, a′) : a′ ∈ AI1} do
. Fill (σ′1, σ2) by summing up all entries {v[σ′1, (I, a′)] : a′ ∈ AI} in accordance with the
von Stengel-Forges constraints
28 S ← S unionsq {(σ′1, σ2)}
29 D ← D / h{1} where h : v 7→∑a′∈AI v[σ′1, (I, a′)]
30 FILLOUTCOLUMN((σ′1, σ2), I)
31 return (S,D)
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Lemma 4 (Inductive contract for DECOMPOSE). Assume that at the beginning of each call to
DECOMPOSE((σ1, σ2),S,D) the following conditions hold
(Pre1) S contains only relevant sequence pairs and D consists of vectors indexed by exactly the
indices in S.
(Pre2) S does not contain any relevant sequence pairs which are descendants of (σ1, σ2), with
the only exception of (σ1, σ2) itself. In formulas,
S ∩ {(σ′1, σ′2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 : σ′1  σ1, σ′2  σ2} = {(σ1, σ2)}.
Then, at the end of the call, the returned set (S′,D′) are such that
(Post1) S′ contains only relevant sequence pairs and D′ consists of vectors v indexed by exactly
the indices in S′.
(Post2) The call has filled in exactly all relevant sequence pair indices that are descendants of
(σ1, σ2) (except for (σ1, σ2) itself, which was already filled in). In formulas,
S′ = S unionsq {(σ′1, σ′2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 : σ′1  σ1, σ′2  σ2, (σ′1, σ′2) 6= (σ1, σ2), σ′1 ./ σ′2}.
(Post3) D′ satisfies the subset of von Stengel-Forges constraints∑
a∈AI
v[(I, a), σ′2] = v[σ(I), σ′2] ∀σ′2  σ2, I ∈ I1 s.t. σ′2 ./ I, σ(I)  σ1∑
a∈AJ
v[σ′1, (J, a)] = v[σ′1, σ(J)] ∀σ′1  σ1, J ∈ I2 s.t. σ′1 ./ J, σ(J)  σ2.
Proof. By induction.
• Base case. The base case is any (σ1, σ2) such that there is no σ′1  σ1, σ′2  σ2, σ′1 ./ σ′2. In that
case, the set B is empty, so the algorithm terminates immediately without modifying the sets S
and D. Consequently, (Post1) and (Post2) hold trivially from (Pre1) and (Pre2). (Post3) reduces
to an empty set of constraints, so (Post3) holds as well.
• Inductive step. In order to use the inductive hypothesis, we will need to prove that the precon-
ditions for DECOMPOSE hold on Lines 15 and 25. We will focus on Line 15 (I ∈ I1), as the
analysis for the other case (I ∈ I2) is symmetric. (Pre1) clearly holds, since we always update
S and D in tandem. Since all iterations of the for loop on Line 10 touch different information
sets, at the time of the recursive call on Line 15, and given (Post2) for all previous recursive calls,
the only relevant sequence pairs (σ′′1 , σ′′2 ) such that σ′′1  σ′1, σ′′2  σ2 that have been filled are the
ones on Lines 12 and 13. So, (Pre2) holds.
We now check that the preconditions for FILLOUTROW hold at Line 20. (Pre1), (Pre2), (Pre3),
and (Pre4) are trivial. (Pre5) and (Pre7) are guaranteed by (Post2) and (Post3) of DECOMPOSE
applied to Line 15. (Pre6) holds because of Lines 18 and 19.
Using the inductive contracts of FILLOUTROW, FILLOUTCOLUMN and DECOMPOSE for the
recursive calls, we now show that all postconditions hold at the end of the call. (Post1) is trivial
since we always update S and D together. (Post2) holds by keeping track of what entries are
filled in Lines 12, 13, 18, 19, 22, 23, 28, 29, as well as those filled in the calls to FILLOUTROW,
FILLOUTCOLUMN and DECOMPOSE, as regulated by postcondition (Post2) in the inductive
contracts of the functions. In order to verify (Post3), we need to verify that the constraints that are
not already guaranteed by the recursive calls hold. In particular, we need to verify that
A
∑
a∈AI
v[(I, a), σ2] = v[σ1, σ2] ∀I ∈ I1 s.t. σ2 ./ I, σ(I) = σ1, I /∈ B
B
∑
a∈AJ
v[σ1, (J, a)] = v[σ1, σ2] ∀J ∈ I2 s.t. σ1 ./ J, σ(J) = σ2, J /∈ B.
We will show that constraints A hold; the proof for B is symmetric. Using Lemma 2 together
with the definition of B (Lines 1-9), any information set I ∈ Ii : σ(I) = σi, σ−i ./ I that is not in
B must have σ−i-rank exactly 1. Let I ∈ I1 be such that σ2 ./ I, σ(I) = σ1, I /∈ B, as required in
A . Since the σ2-rank of I is 1, let J be the only information set in I2 such that I 
 J, σ(J) = σ2.
Note that J ∈ B. The entries v[(I, a), σ2] : a ∈ AI were filled in Lines 28 and 29 when the for
loop picked up J ∈ B. So, in particular,
v[(I, a), σ2] =
∑
a′∈AJ
v[(I, a), (J, a′)] ∀a ∈ AI .
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Summing the above equations across a ∈ AI , we obtain∑
a∈AI
v[(I, a), σ2] =
∑
a∈AI
∑
a′∈AJ
v[(I, a), (J, a′)]
=
∑
a′∈AJ
∑
a∈AI
v[(I, a), (J, a′)]
=
∑
a′∈AJ
v[σ1, (J, a
′)]
= v[σ1, σ2],
where the last equation follows from the way the entries v[σ1, (J, a′)] : a′ ∈ AJ were filled in
(Lines 22 and 23). This shows that the set of constraints A hold.
Theorem 2. The von Stengel-Forges polytope V of a two-player perfect-recall triangle-free EFG can
be expressed via a sequence of scaled extensions with simplexes and singleton sets:
V = {1} h1/ X1 h2/ X2 h3/ · · · hn/ Xn, where, for i = 1, . . . , n, either Xi = ∆si or Xi = {1}, (2)
and hi is a linear function. Furthermore, an exact algorithm exists to compute such expression in
linear time in the dimensionality of V, and so, in time at most quadratic in the size of the game.
Proof. The correctness of the algorithm follow from (Post3) in the inductive contract. Every time the
set of partially-filled-in vectors D gets extended, it is extended with either the singleton set {1} or
a simplex. In either case the nonnegative affine functions h used are linear. So, the decomposition
structure is as in the statement. Finally, since the overhead of each call (on top of the recursive calls)
is linear in the number of relevant sequence pairs (σ, τ) ∈ Σ1 ./Σ2 that are filled, and each relevant
sequence pair is filled only once, the complexity of the algorithm is linear in the number of relevant
sequence pairs.
B Relationship Between V and Ξ
B.1 Preliminaries: Definition of the Polytope of Correlation Plans
Let Πi(σ) denote the subset of reduced-normal-form plans Πi for Player i prescribe all actions of
Player i on the path from the root of the game down to the information set-action pair σ (if σ =, assign
Πi(∅) = Πi). The transformation from a correlated distribution µ to its correlation plan representation
is achieved using a linear function
f : ∆|Π1×Π2| → R|Σ1 ./Σ2|≥0 .
Specifically, f takes a generic distribution µ over Π1 ×Π2 and maps to the vector ξ = f(µ), called a
correlation plan, whose components are
ξ[σ1, σ2] :=
∑
pi1∈Π1(σ1)
∑
pi2∈Π2(σ2)
µ(pi1, pi2) ∀(σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 ./Σ2. (4)
The set of all valid correlation plans, Ξ, is defined as the image Im f of f as the distribution µ takes
any possible value in ∆|Π1×Π2|.
Remark 2. Since f sums up distinct entries from the distribution µ, all entries in ξ = f(µ) are in the
range [0, 1].
B.2 Proofs
Lemma 5. Let 1(pi1,pi2) ∈ ∆|Π1×Π2| denote the distribution over Π1 ×Π2 that assigns mass 1 to the
pair (pi1, pi2), and mass 0 to any other pair of reduced-normal-form plans. Then,
Ξ = co{f(1(pi1,pi2)) : pi1 ∈ Π1, pi2 ∈ Π2}.
Proof. The “deterministic” distributions 1(pi1,pi2) are the vertices of ∆
|Π1×Π2|, so, in particular,
∆|Π1×Π2| = co{1(pi1,pi2) : pi1 ∈ Π1, pi2 ∈ Π2}.
Since by definition Ξ = Im f , and f is a linear function, the images (under f) of the 1(pi1,pi2) are a
convex basis for Ξ, which is exactly the statement.
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Lemma 6. Let v ∈ V . For all σ1 ∈ Σ1 such that v[σ1,∅] = 0, v[σ1, σ2] = 0 for all σ2 ./ σ1. Similarly,
for all σ2 ∈ Σ2 such that v[∅, σ2] = 0, v[σ1, σ2] = 0 for all σ1 ./ σ2.
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction on the depth of the sequences σ1 and σ2. The depth
depth(σ) of a generic sequence σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi of Player i is defined as the number of actions that
Player i plays on the path from the root of the tree down to action a at information set I included.
Conventionally, we let the depth of the empty sequence be 0.
Take σ1 ∈ Σ1 such that v[σ1,∅] = 0. For σ2 of depth 0 (that is, σ2 = ∅), clearly v[σ1, σ2] = 0. For
the inductive step, suppose that v[σ1, σ2] = 0 for all σ2 ∈ Σ2, σ1 ./ σ2 such that depth(σ2) ≤ d2. We
will show that v[σ2, σ2] = 0 for depth(σ2) ≤ d2 + 1. Indeed, let (I, a′) = σ2 ./ σ1 of depth d2 + 1.
Since v ∈ V, in particular the von Stengel-Forges constraint ∑a∈AI v[σ1, (I, a)] = v[σ1, σ(I)] must
hold. The depth of σ(I) is d2, so by the inductive hypothesis, it must be v[σ1, σ(I)] = 0, and therefore∑
a∈AI v[σ1, (I, a)] = 0. But all entries of v are nonnegative, so it must be v[σ1, (I, a)] = 0 for all
a ∈ AI , and in particular for (I, a′) = σ2. This completes the proof by induction.
The proof for the second part is analogous.
Lemma 7. Let v ∈ V have integer {0, 1} coordinates. Then, for all (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 ./Σ2, it holds that
v[σ1, σ2] = v[σ1,∅] · v[∅, σ2].
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction on the depth of the sequences, similarly to Lemma 6.
The base case for the induction proof corresponds to the case where σ1 and σ2 both have depth 0,
that is, σ1 = σ2 = ∅. In that case, the theorem is clearly true, because v[∅,∅] = 1 as part of the von
Stengel-Forges constraints (1).
Now, suppose that the statement holds as long as depth(σ1),depth(σ2) ≤ d. We will show that
the statement will hold for any (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 ./Σ2 such that depth(σ1),depth(σ2) ≤ d+ 1. Indeed,
consider (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 ./Σ2 such that depth(σ1), depth(σ2) ≤ d+ 1. If any of the sequences is the
empty sequence, the statements holds trivially, so assume that neither is the empty sequence and in
particular σ1 = (I, a), σ2 = (J, b). If v[σ1,∅] = 0, then from Lemma 6 v[σ1, σ2] = 0 and the statement
holds. Similarly, if v[∅, σ2] = 0, then v[σ1, σ2] = 0, and the statement holds. Hence, the only
remaining case given the integrality assumption on the coordinates of v is v[σ1,∅] = v[∅, σ2] = 1.
From the von Stengel-Forges constraints, v[σ(I),∅] =
∑
a′∈AI v[(I, a
′),∅] = 1 +∑
a′∈AI ,a′ 6=a v[(I, a
′),∅] ≥ 1. Hence, because all entries of v are in {0, 1}, it must be v[σ(I),∅] = 1
and v[(I, a′),∅] = 0 for all a′ ∈ AI , a′ 6= a. With a similar argument we conclude that
v[∅, σ(J)] = 1 and v[∅, (J, b′)] = 0 for all b′ ∈ AJ , b 6= b′. Using the inductive hypothesis,
v[σ(I), σ(J)] = v[σ(I),∅] · v[∅, σ(J)] = 1.
Now, using the von Stengel-Forges constraints together with the equality v[σ(I), σ(J)] = 1 we just
proved, we conclude that ∑
a′∈AI
∑
b′∈AJ
v[(I, a′), (J, b′)] = 1. (5)
On the other hand, since v[(I, a′),∅] = 0 for all a′ ∈ AI , a′ 6= a and v[∅, (J, b′)] = 0 for all
b′ ∈ AJ , b′ 6= b, from Lemma 6 we have that
a′ 6= a ∨ b′ 6= b =⇒ v[(I, a′), (J, b′)] = 0. (6)
From (6) and (5), we conclude that v[(I, a), (J, b)] = v[σ1, σ2] = 1 = v[σ1,∅] · v[∅, σ2], as we wanted
to show.
Theorem 3. Let Γ be a two-player perfect-recall extensive-form game, let V be its von Stengel-Forges
polytope, and let Ξ be its polytope of correlation plans. Then, Ξ = V if and only if all vertices of V
have integer {0, 1} coordinates.
Proof. We prove the two implications separately.
(⇒) We start by proving that if Ξ = V, then all vertices of V have integer {0, 1} coordinates. Since
V = Ξ by hypothesis, from 5 we can write
V = co{f(1(pi1,pi2)) : pi1 ∈ Π1, pi2 ∈ Π2}.
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So, to prove this direction it is enough to show that f(1(pi1,pi2)) has integer {0, 1} coordinates
for all (pi1, pi2) ∈ Π1×Π2. To see that, we use the definition (4): each entry in f(1(pi1,pi2)) is the
sum of distinct entries of 1(pi1,pi2). Given that by definition 1(pi1,pi2) has exactly one entry with
value 1 and |Π1 ×Π2| − 1 entries with value 0, we conclude that all coordinates of f(1(pi1,pi2))
are in {0, 1}.
(⇐) We now show that if all vertices of V have integer {0, 1} coordinates, then V ⊆ Ξ. This is
enough, since the reverse inclusion, V ⊇ Ξ, is trivial and already known [24]. Let {v1, . . . ,vn}
be the vertices of V . To conclude that V ⊆ Ξ, we will prove that vi ∈ Ξ for all i = 1, . . . , n. This
will be sufficient since both V and Ξ are convex.
Let v ∈ {v1, . . . ,vn} be any vertex of V. By hypothesis, v[σ1, σ2] ∈ {0, 1} for all (σ1, σ2) ∈
Σ1 ./Σ2. Because v satisfies the von Stengel-Forges constraints and furthermore v has {0, 1}
entries by hypothesis, the two vectors q1, q2 defined according to q1[σ1] = v[σ1,∅] (σ1 ∈ Σ1)
and q2[σ2] = v[∅, σ2] (σ2 ∈ Σ2) are pure sequence-form strategies. Now, let pi∗1 and pi∗2 be
the reduced-normal form plans corresponding to q1 and q2, respectively. We will show that
v = f(1(pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2 )
), which will immediately imply that v ∈ Ξ using Lemma 5.
Since 1(pi∗1 ,pi∗2 ) has exactly one positive entry with value 1 in the position corresponding to
(pi∗1 , pi∗2), by definition of the linear map f , for any (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 ./Σ2,
f(1(pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2 )
)[σ1, σ2] = 1[σ1 ∈ Π1(σ1)] · 1[σ2 ∈ Π2(σ2)]. (7)
So, using the known properties of pure sequence-form strategies, we obtain
f(1(pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2 )
)[σ1, σ2] = q1[σ1] · q2[σ2] = v[σ1,∅] · v[∅, σ2] = v[σ1, σ2],
where the last equality follows from Lemma 7. Since the equality holds for any (σ1, σ2) ∈
Σ1 ./Σ2, we have that v = f(1(pi∗1 ,pi∗2 )).
Lemma 1. Let X ,Y , and h be as in Definition 1. If X is a convex polytope with vertices {x1, . . . ,xn},
and Y is a convex polytope with vertices {y1, . . . ,ym}, then X / h Y is a convex polytope whose
vertices are a nonempty subset of {(xi, h(xi)yj) : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}}.
Proof. Take any point z ∈ X / h Y. By definition of scaled, extension, there exist x ∈ X ,y ∈
Y such that z = (x, h(x)y). Since {x1, . . . ,xn} are the vertices of X , x can be written as a
convex combination x =
∑n
i=1 λixi where (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ ∆n. Similarly, y =
∑m
i=1 µiyi for some
(µ1, . . . , µm) ∈ ∆m. Hence, using the hypothesis that h is affine, we can write
z = (x, h(x)y)
=
 n∑
i=1
λixi, h
(
n∑
i=1
λixi
)
m∑
j=1
µjyj

=
 n∑
i=1
λixi,
(
n∑
i=1
λih(xi)
)
m∑
j=1
µjyj

=
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
λiµj(xi, h(xi)yj).
Since λiµj ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and
∑n
i=1
∑m
j=1 λiµj = (
∑n
i=1 λi)(
∑m
j=1 µj) =
1, we conclude that z ∈ co{(xi, h(xi)yj) : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}}. On the other hand,
(xi, h(xi)yj) ∈ X / h Y, so
X h/ Y = co{(xi, h(xi)yj) : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}}.
Since the vertices of a (nonempty) polytope are a (nonempty) subset of any convex basis for the
polytope, the vertices of X / h Y must be a nonempty subset of {(xi, h(xi)yj) : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈
{1, . . . ,m}}, which is the statement.
Theorem 4. Let V be the von Stengel-Forges polytope of a two-player triangle-free game (Defini-
tion 3). All vertices of V have integer {0, 1} coordinates.
Proof. We prove the statement by induction over the scaled-extension-based decomposition
V = {1} h1/ X1 h2/ · · · hn/ Xn.
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In particular, we will show that for all k = 0, . . . , n, the coordinates of the vertices of the polytope
Vk = {1}
h1
/ · · · hk/ Xk
constructed by considering only the first k scaled extensions in the decomposition are all integer.
Since V ⊆ [0, 1]|Σ1 ./Σ2| (Remark 2), this immediately implies that each coordinate is in {0, 1}.
• Base case: k = 0. In this case, V0 = {1}. The only vertex is {1}, which is integer. So, base case
trivially holds.
• Inductive step. Suppose that the polytope Vk (k < n) has integer vertices. We will show that
the same holds for Vk+1. Clearly, Vk+1 = Vk / hk+1 Xk+1. From the properties of the structural
decomposition, we know that Kk+1 is either the singleton {1}, or a probability simplex ∆sk+1 for
some appropriate dimension sk+1. We break the analysis accordingly.
– If Xk+1 = {1}, the scaled extension represents filling in a linearly-dependent entry in v ∈ V
by summing already-filled-in entries. So, hk+1 takes a partially-filled-in vector from Vk and
sums up some of its coordinates. Let v1, . . . ,vn be the vertices of Vk. Using Lemma 1, the
vertices of Vk+1 are a subset of
{(vi, h(vi) · 1) : i = 1, . . . , n}. (8)
Since by inductive hypothesis vi have integer coordinates, and h sums up some of them,
h(v)i is integer for all i = 1, . . . , n. So, all of the vectors in (8) have integer coordinates, and
in particular this must be true of the vertices of Vk+1.
– If Xk+1 = ∆sk+1 , the scaled extension represents the operation of partitioning an already-
filled-in entry v[σ, τ ] of Vk into si non-negative real values. The affine function hk+1 extracts
the entry v[σ, τ ] from each vector v ∈ Vk. Let v1, . . . ,vn be the vertices of Vk. The vertices
of ∆sk+1 are the canonical basis vectors {e1, . . . , esk+1}. From Lemma 1, the vertices of
Vk+1 are a subset of
{(vi, h(vi)ej) : i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , sk+1}
= {(vi, vi[σ, τ ]ej) : i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , sk+1}. (9)
Since by inductive hypothesis the vertices vi have integer coordinates, vi[σ, τ ] is an integer.
Since the canonical basis vector only have entries in {0, 1}, all of the vectors in (9) have
integer coordinates. So, in particular, this must be true of the vertices of Vk+1.
C Additional Experimental Results
In this section we present additional computational results. Specifically, we present results on how
well algorithms can solve for EFCE (and thus also EFCCE and NFCCE since they are supsets
of EFCE) after our new scaled-extension-based structural decomposition has been computed for
the polytope of correlation plans using the algorithm that we presented in the body. The speed
of that algorithm for computing the decomposition is extremely fast, as shown in the body both
theoretically and experimentally. Here we report the performance of two leading algorithms for
finding an approximate optimal EFCE after the decomposition algorithm has completed. Specifically,
we compare the performance of the regret-minimization method of Farina et al. [12] to that of the
barrier algorithm for linear programming implemented by the Gurobi commercial linear programming
solver, as described in the body of the paper. (On these problems, any linear programming solver
could be used in principle, but simplex and dual simplex methods—even the ones in Gurobi—are
prohibitively slow. Similarly, the subgradient descent method of Farina et al. [11] is known to be
dominated by the regret-minimization method of Farina et al. [12].)
Both algorithms are used to converge to a feasible EFCE—that is, no objective function was set—in
the largest Goofspiel instance (k = 5). Our implementation of the regret minimization method is
single-threaded, while we allow Gurobi to use 30 threads. All experiments were conducted on a
machine with 64 cores and 500GB of memory. Gurobi required roughly 200GB of memory, while
the memory footprint of the regret-minimization algorithm was less than 2GB.
At all times, the regret-minimization algorithm produces feasible correlation plans, that is, points that
belong to Ξ = V. So, that algorithm’s iterates’ infeasibility is defined as how incentive-incompatible
the computed correlation plan is, measured as the difference in value that each player would gain by
optimally deviating from any recommendation at any information set in the game. In contrast, the
barrier method does not guarantee that the correlation plan is primal feasible, that is, the correlation
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plans produced by the barrier algorithm might not be in Ξ = V. Therefore, for Gurobi, we measure
infeasibility as the maximum between (i) the (maximum) violation of the constraints that define V,
and (ii) the incentive-incompatibility of the iterate.
Figure 4 shows the results. The regret minimization algorithm works better as an anytime algorithm
and leads to lower infeasibility for most of the run. The barrier method needs significant time to
preprocess before even the first iterates are found. After that it converges rapidly.
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Figure 4: Performance of the regret minimization method of Farina et al. [12] compared to Gurobi’s
barrier method in the largest Goofspiel game (k = 5).
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